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Abstract
This paper analyzes delegation and joint decision making in an environment with
private information and partially aligned preferences. We compare the benefits of
these two decision making procedures as well as the interaction between them. We
give a condition under which delegation is preferred to ex post joint decision making
and we show how the interaction between delegation and ex post joint decision
making always crowds out delegation. Finally, we analyze how the availability of
the principal at the communication stage affects our results.
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1 Introduction
Effective decision making often relies on obtaining valuable information from informed
parties. In many cases, the informed party might not have the same preferences as the
decision maker and needs to be given the right incentives to reveal this information.
Contract theory has shown how to optimally solve this adverse selection problem using a
menu of contracts containing information-contingent decisions and payments.1 However,
payments that depend on the information (or “state” as the literature calls it) are not
always feasible. For instance, a manager’s wage might depend on the overall profit and
state of the firm, but it is never directly contingent on the outcome of all the smaller
decisions that the manager is involved in.
In this paper we analyse two different decision making procedures without state-
contingent transfers as well as their interaction. Namely, we focus on how delegation
and ex post joint decision making give incentives to reveal private information and how
the outcome in terms of actually decision is chosen under these schemes. Following the
literature on delegation (Holmström, 1977, 1984; Melumad and Shibano, 1991) we show
that when ex post joint decision making is not possible, the standard delegation results
apply. That is, it is optimal to allow the agent to take any decision below a certain
threshold but restrict the upper end of admissible decisions.
Furthermore, we show how the possibility of ex post joint decision making always leads
to information revelation when delegation is not an option and the standard unraveling
result (Grossman, 1981; Milgrom, 1981) also holds in our environment. However, because
the final decision is a joint decision, it will be not be equal to the principal’s preferred
decision but it will be somewhere between the principal and the agent’s preferred decisions.
We compare the benefits of these two decision-making procedures and give a condition
under which delegation is preferred by the principal. In particular, our condition implies
that even though ex post joint decision making always leads to information revelation,
there are settings in which delegation does better. This is for instance the case when the
agent has a lot of bargaining power at the decision making stage.
We also consider the interaction of delegation and ex post joint decision making.
Importantly, we show how the possibility of ex post joint decision making always crowds
out delegation as it gives incentives to deviate from the delegation set for a range of
information realizations and thus in equilibrium delegation breaks down. This happens
regardless of whether delegation is preferred to joint decision making or not. Therefore,
1See for instance Laffont and Martimort (2002).
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in some case not being able to fully commit to delegation can be detrimental for the
principal.
In practice, a principal has a lot of responsibilities and tasks that might impose restric-
tions on her availability for communication with other agents. Any web search including
the words “delegation” and “managers” will give you a bunch of articles2 which talk about
the manager’s limited time. We incorporate this into our framework and show how the
availability of the principal at the communication stage affects our results. In particular,
we show that the more likely it is that the principal is available for communication the
smaller is the delegation set. Furthermore the principal’s expected utility is convex in the
probability of being available for communication. Thus, in a stylized model with two ex
ante symmetric agents, we show that it is optimal for the principal to treat the agents
asymmetrically; always communicate with one agent and thus credibly commit to full
delegation to the other agent.
We are motivated by the burgeoning literature on delegation pioneered by Holmström
(1977, 1984). As in Holmström (1977, 1984) we focus on interval delegation. However
Melumad and Shibano (1991) characterize the optimum among all delegation sets and
show that it is an interval.3 Although Alonso and Matouscheck (2008) generalize the
optimal delegation problem to a generalized quadratic loss function, we stick to the “sim-
ple” quadratic loss function with a constant bias and weight. Again, this is to be able to
better focus on communication without introducing too many other issues. Our contri-
bution to this literature is twofold. First we compare the benefits of delegation to joint
decision making. Second, we add communication via ex post joint decision making into
a delegation environment and thereby focus on this positive aspect rather than the more
normative aspect of the optimality of delegation that this literature studies. 4
We are also related to the literature on limited attention in that we assume that the
principal might not always be available for communication and ex post decision making.
In line with Matějka and McKay (2012), Persson (2013) and Gabaix (2014) we assume
2For instance “Smart Leadership: Delegate, Prioritize and Simplify” Business News Daily (October
25, 2013) and “Tips for the Overworked Manager” (http://work.chron.com/tips-overworked-manager-
5247.html).
3Martimort and Semenov (2006) provide a more general condition on the distribution of the state
under which the optimal mechanism is indeed continuous as under interval delegation.
4Other contributions to the delegation literature include Shin and Strausz (2014) who show how
delegation, by generating additional private information, can improve dynamic incentives under limited
commitment. Other papers have focused on the allocation of formal decision rights (Aghion and Tirole,
1997), project choice rather than project size (Armstrong and Vickers, 2010), relational delegation (Alonso
and Matouscheck, 2007), delegation in moral hazard environment (Bester and Krähmer, 2008), etc.
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that the principal has limited attention and cannot always deal with everything.
The model is presented in Section 2. In Section 3, we characterize the outcome of dele-
gation and in Section 4 that of ex post joint decision making. Section 5 compares the two
outcomes whereas Section 6 analyze the interaction between delegation and joint decision
making. Section 7 provides a robustness check and discusses how the principal’s time
constraint affects delegation and the probability that the principal actually is available
for joint decision making at the ex post stage. Section 8 briefly concludes.
2 The model
We use the workhorse model of the delegation and communication literature in which a
principal has the authority to make a decision but an agent has acces to decision relevant
information. We study the principal’s optimal decision and the agent’s incentives to reveal
his private information. As in the afore-mentionned literature, contracts with contingent
transfers are not allowed, but the principal can commit to transferring the decision rights
to the agent (delegation). We allow for this transfer to be incomplete, in that the principal
can constrain the agent’s decision making. We also allow the principal and the agent to
make a joint decision at the ex post stage. Whereas the principal has decision power at
the initial stage, this joint decision making should be thought of as capturing ex post
hold-up issues within the organization.
Preferences: The principal’s and the agent’s utilities depend on the implemented
decision, the state of the world and are partially aligned. The decision is represented by
y ∈ Y ⊂ R and the state is denoted θ ∈ Θ = [0, 1]. Both the principal and the agent have
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions that take the form of quadratic loss functions
where the principal’s preferred decision is yP (θ) = θ and the agent’s preferred decision is
yA(θ) = θ + b, where 0 < b <
1
2
5. Formally, the principal’s utility is
uP (y, θ) = − (y − θ)2 .
The agent’s utility is
uA (y, θ, b) = − (y − θ − b)2 .
Information: Before the decision y is made, the agent observes the value of θ, but
the principal does not. It is common knowledge that θ is distributed according to the
5This assumption simply means that the difference in preferences between the principal and the agent
is not too large so that there is (some) scope for non-trivial delegation and communication.
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uniform distribution on Θ = [0, 1].
Decision making: We allow for two different ways of reaching a decision; Delegation
and Joint Decision Making. First we study them separately and compare the outcomes.
Then we allow the interaction of the two procedures.
• Delegation: We adopt an incomplete contracting approach where the principal
cannot rely upon a court-enforced contracts with contingent transfers. However,
she can commit to allowing the agent to take whatever decision he finds appropriate
within a set of pre-specified decisions. Like Holmström (1977, 1984) we focus on
interval delegation in which the principal specifies a set D = [d, d̄] from which the
agent is free to choose any decision he wants.
• Joint Decision Making: After the agent has observed the private information
θ, he can choose to reveal this to the principal. Revealing this information does
not only allow the agent to transfer this knowledge to the principal, it also allows
him to participate in the final decision making. Formally we assume that following
communication of θ, a decision is reached jointly by the principal and the agent so
as to maxmize a weighted sum of the two players’ utility. The relative weight on
the agent’s utility is denoted by a ∈ [0, 1].6
Therefore, when considering the interaction between delegation and joint decision making,
if the decision has been delegated to the agent, he either makes a decision within the
permissible delegation set or communicates information to the principal and they reach
the final decision together. If no delegation has been implemented, then either the agent
does not reveal any information about θ and the principal alone takes the final decision
or the agent reveals information about θ and they reach the final decision together.
Timing: The timing is as follows. First, the principal chooses a delegation set in
which the agent is free to take any decision he wants. Second, the agent obtains a perfect
signal s ∈ S = Θ. Having observed this signal, if the decision has been delegated the
agent can choose any decision within the initial delegation set or he can communicate θ
to the principal and enter the joint-decision-making stage. If the decision has not been
delegated, the agent can choose whether to reveal the signal to the principal or not and
the principal has to make a decision. Finally, the decision is implemented and payoffs are
realized. The timing is illustrated below.














In this section we study the outcome of delegation in an environment where ex post joint
decision making is not possible. That is, the principal commits to allowing the agent to
choose any decision within a pre-specified set and no other decisions (or communication)
can take place between the players after this delegation decision has been made. When
no deviation from the initial delegation set is possible, then the principal’s problem is to
find a delegation set that maximizes her expected utility. To this aim, it is useful to first
characterize the agent’s behavior when faced with a given delegation set.
Lemma 1. Consider a given delegation set D = [d, d̄].
• If θ < max{0, d− b}, then the agent will choose yd = d.
• If θ ∈ [max{0, d− b},max{0, d̄− b}], then the agent will choose yd = θ + b.
• If θ > d̄− b, the agent will choose yd = d̄.
The proof of this lemma is straightforward (and therefore omitted). But the intuition
goes as follows: If θ is in the interval [max{0, d − b},max{0, d̄ − b}], then the agent’s
preferred decision is within the admissible set D and the agent will opt for this decision
as it maximizes his utility. If θ is higher or lower than this set, the agent’s preferred
decision is not permissible and the agent is constrained to pick the decision that is closest
to his preferred decision among all permissible decisions (i.e., D). The preferred decision
is increasing in θ so that for low values of θ, this means choosing yd = d and for high







d− b d̄− b
Figure 2: The agent’s decision for a given delegation set
Using this lemma, it is easy to write the principal’s expected utility as the sum of the













subject to 0 ≤ d ≤ d̄ ≤ 1.
The optimal delegation set that solves (1) follows from the literature (Melumad and
Shibano, 1991) and is summarized in the following proposition.7
Proposition 1. When ex-post communication is not possible, then the optimal delegation
set is Do = [0, 1− b].
In this setting the interval contract Do is an optimal contract and is illustrated below.
It is such that the agent can make any decision below a certain threshold d̄. The value
of the upper bound d̄ depends on the agent’s bias. When preferences become less aligned
(b goes to θ), delegation becomes less valuable because the agent always wants to make
too “high” decisions. Conversely, when preferences becomes more aligned (b is close to
0), then full delegation becomes optimal since the agent’s optimal decision is the same as
the principal’s optimal decision.
7In fact, there exists many optimal delegation sets (See Alonso and Matouscheck (2008) page 267).
Decisions between 0 and b will never be chosen by the agent, but for notational simplicity and to get
a more coherent representations, we allow them in our characterisation. Any other admissible decisions








Figure 3: Optimal delegation without communication
The principal’s expected surplus from the optimal delegation set can easily be calcu-
lated and is given in the next lemma.
Lemma 2. The principal’s expected surplus from Do is equal to
WD = −b2(1− 4
3
b). (2)
The lower the agent’s bias, the higher is the principal’s expected surplus. This is of
course a direct consequence of preferences become more aligned as b decreases.
The expected surplus reported in Lemma 2 only takes into account the gains for the
specific task y. However, delegation has other benefits as well. In particular it frees up
time for the principal so that she can engage in other (more important?) tasks. This is
often a reason for the task being delegated in the first place. However, these benefits are
not taken into account here. In Section 7 we attempt to at least partially include such
benefits.
4 Joint Decision Making
In this section we analyze the pure joint decision making game and do not allow the
principal to delegate the decision. That is, the principal cannot commit to a delegation
set. However, the agent can communicate information at the communication stage and the
final decision is taken after that. Our focus is thus on the outcome of the communication
8
and decision stage in the absence of delegation. In this environment, the appropriate
equilibrium concept is that of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and we proceed by backward
induction.
Whenever the agent reveal his private information and the principal and the agent
enter (jointly) into the decision stage, the outcome of the joint decision making is given
in the next lemma.
Lemma 3. Joint decision making over y yields the following outcome:
yb(θ) = θ + ab. (3)
The outcome of the joint-decision-making stage is somewhere between the principal
and the agent’s preferred decision. The higher the agent’s relative weight (a), the closer
the outcome will be to the agent’s preferred decision. While a lower a leads to the joint






Figure 4: Decision under joint decision making
As the next proposition shows, even in this environment where, because of ex post
joint decision making, the principal is not allowed to impose her preferred decision, the
usual unraveling result (Grossman, 1981; Milgrom, 1981) applies.
Proposition 2. The agent always have an incentive to reveal his private information and
engage in ex post joint decision making. The final decision is given by Lemma 3.
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We can easily calculate the principal’s expected utility.
Lemma 4. The principal’s expected utility is
WB = −(ab)2. (4)
5 Delegation vs. Joint Decision Making
We are now ready to compare the outcome under delegation to that under joint decision
making setting and give conditions under which the principal prefers one procedure over
the other.
Proposition 3. Joint decision making is preferred to delegation if and only if
1− 4
3
b ≥ a2. (5)
This proposition states that joint decision making is preferred to delegation if and
only if the agent’s relative weight in the joint decision making process is sufficiently
small. When the agent’s relative weight is not too high, the gains from using all the
information available in the environment (at the small loss from achieving a slightly
suboptimal decision) outweighs the expected gains from delegation. We have thus shown
that the unraveling (Milgrom, 1981; Grossman, 1981)8 and subsequent decision-making is
beneficial to the principal even beyond the case where the agent has no say in the ex post
decision making. However, it does not extend indefinitely and Proposition 3 characterizes
this limit.








Figure 5: Illustration of (5)
The agent’s bias influences both the expected surplus under delegation and joint deci-
sion making. However, for high values of b, it is preferred to engage in delegation rather
than joint decision making. The intuition for this is that under joint decision making
the principal cannot control the loss associated with a high b as the decision is always
ab above the principal’s preferred decision. However, under delegation, the principal can
control the losses associated with having a biased agent through the upper bound of the
delegation set. When b is sufficiently large, controling this upper bound becomes more
valuable.
6 Delegation and joint decision making
The previous section compared delegation and joint decision making. In this section we
allow the two to coexist and show how joint decision making always crowds out delegation.
In this environment, it is as if the joint decision making game as described in Section 4
is augmented by a commitment to a delegation set before the game is played. Although
with an initial delegation decision, the default decision maker at the final decision making
stage is now the agent9 and this might change incentives to engage in communication,
the timing described in Section 2 and 4 is otherwise unchanged. The perfect Bayesian
equilibrium concept still applies.
9At least when the principal chooses to delegate the decision to the agent.
11
We solve the model by backward induction and start by characterizing the outcome
of the decision stage. If the signal s is disclosed at the communication stage, then joint
decision making leads to y = s + ab. If no communication took place, then the agent
chooses his preferred decision within the initial delegation set D. In the case where
no delegation has taken place, we know from Section 4 that the usual unraveling result
applies.
Consider a given delegation interval D = [d, d̄]. At the communication stage, the
agent’s best response is to withhold s and stick to the initial delegation set (which is
legally binding) if and only if uA (s, s) < maxy∈D u (y, s). This is formally stated below.
Lemma 5. Given an initial delegation set D = [d, d̄], the agent communicates s if and
only if s = θ is such that
s > d̄− ab or s < d− (2− a)b.
Figure 6 illustrates the result in Lemma 5 and shows that for values of θ included in
or close to the initial delegation set information is withheld while it is disclosed for more













Figure 6: The agent’s communication decision and associated outcome y
The agent has an incentive to reveal extreme information because any decision that
might be taken when witholding the information is considered to be worse for the agent
than the decision that the principal will take when she knows the state of the world. Or
12
equivalently, for extreme values of θ any d ∈ D is worse than the weighted average of the
principal and the agent’s preferred decisions.
It can easily be shown that in the presence of joint decision making, the equilibrium
delegation set collapses to a single point, i.e., a degenerate delegation set. This is the
purpose of the next lemma.
Lemma 6. An equilibrium delegation set is a point:
d∗ = d̄∗.
Using this lemma, we can show that the possibility of ex post communication always
crowds out delegation, i.e., the only possible equilibria are such that either no delegation
takes place or a degenerate delegation set which is such that communication always takes
place is optimal.
Proposition 4. In equilibrium, the only admissible delegation sets are D = {d} where
d ≤ ab. These delegation sets and no delegation lead to communication for all values of θ
and are payoff equivalent for the principal.
The intuition behind this result is somewhat reminiscent of Szalay (2005) who shows
that to give the agents incentives to acquire information, the principal should exclude
options that are interesting for uninformed agents. In our setting, the principal gives
incentives to communicate through a similar mechanism where the no-communication
(status quo) option is generally very bad for the agent.
The result in Proposition 4 is linked to the literature on veto-based mechanisms10 in
which the principal delegates a decision to the agent, but retains the right to veto any
decision made by the agent. Mylovanov (2008) establishes the “veto-power principle”,
according to which the principal can implement an optimal outcome through veto-based
delegation with a properly chosen default decision. In our model everything happens as if
the action y = 0 is the default option and this gives the agent incentives to communicate
his information to improve upon the default option.
As mentioned previously, Proposition 4 shows that communication always crowds out
delegation because the equilibrium delegation set is degenerate and always leads to com-
munication. This is the case even delegation alone performs better than communication
(see condition 5). Our result can therefore be interpreted as showing that communication
is a powerful tool and beneficial tool whenever (5) holds. However, in situations where
10Dessein (2002), Marino (2007) and Mylovanov (2008).
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(pure) delegation is preferred (condition 5 is violated), communication is very bad in that
it prevents the principal from credibly committing to a non-degenerate delegation set. In
the next section we extend our results to the case where ex post communication is not
always possible and discuss informally how the principal may commit to avoid ex post
communication in a credible way.
7 Availability
As mentioned previously, our model does not take into account the external benefits from
delegation such as freeing up time, etc. However, this is often seen as the major benefit
from delegation. In this section we extend our model and show that our results are
robust to the introduction of these additional benefits from delegation. To keep things
simple, we focus on the situation where the principal has all the bargaining power at the
communication stage.11
7.1 Exogenous availability
We do not directly model these additional gains from delegation, but allow for them to
indirectly influence our results in the following way: We assume that at the communication
stage, the principal is only available to communicate with probability α ∈ [0, 1]. A large α
means that the gains from delegation in freed up time is low and the principal is available
for communication with a high probability. If α is low, the gains from freed up time are
large and the principal is very likely to be engaged in work elsewhere and is thus prevented
from engaging in communication with the agent.
Proposition 5. When the principal is available for ex post communication with probability
α ∈ (0, 1), the optimal delegation set is Dα = [0, d̄α], where
d̄α =











Before commenting on this proposition it is worth noticing that when α is equal to one,
communication is always possible, we get a degenrate delegation set found in Proposition
4. In that case, there is minimal delegation. This means that the default option within
11This is equivalent to the setting where the agent’s relative weight in the joint decision making is equal
to 0.
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the initial contract is so low that there are very strong incentives to communicate θ to the
contracting authority. In fact, this allows the principal to obtain her preferred decision in
all states of the world.
The more general result in Proposition 5 paints a more nuanced picture. The principal
will still reduce the delegation set to give incentives to communicate, but she will not
reduce it as much as in Proposition 4.
Clearly the upper bound of the delegation set Dα is between 0 and 1−b. The principal
therefore gives more incentives to communicate than in the delegation set in Proposition
1, but less than when she is always available to adapt the initial decision set after receiving
the new information via communication. In fact, the size of the delegation set now trades
off the gains from incentivising the agents to communicate and gains from a better-
informed decision when the principal is too busy to communicate. This is illustrated in the
following figure which plots the agent’s preferred decision in D under no communication,







Figure 7: Decisions allowed within the initial delegation sets
Furthermore, taking the derivative of d̄α with respect to α shows that this upper
bound is decreasing and concave in α. Intuitively, the more likely it is that the principal
is available for communication, the smaller is the initial delegation set since this gives
stronger incentives to communicate at the ex post stage. The following corollary states
that the principal’s expected utility is everywhere increasing and convex in α. Thus being
more likely to be available for communication is good for the principal in this environment
since it allows her to benefit from ex post communication and better decisions.
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Corollary 1. The principal’s expected utility is increasing and convex in α.
If the principal could directly influence α, it is immediate that the optimal solution
would be to choose α = 1 if condition 5 holds and α = 0 otherwise. Our model suggests
that if by making her time scarce, the principal indirectly commits to not communicating
with the agent and when condition 5 is violated, this increases the principal’s expected
utility.
Finally, the convexity of the principal’s expected utility in the one-agent environment
suggests that in a more complex environment with multiple agents, these should be treated
asymmetrically even when they are ex ante identical. This is the purpose of the next
subsection.
7.2 Endogenous availability
In the previous section, we considered the interaction between a principal and a single
agent. However, often a principal (contracting officer or manager) is facing several agents.
We therefore introduce two agents, 1 and 2, into our framework. This allows us to
endogenize the probability that the principal can communicate with an agent (denoted
by α).
To do so we extend the model presented in Section 2 to include two agents; agent 1
and agent 2. We denote a decision related to agent i by yi ∈ Yi ⊂ R and the associated
state by θi ∈ Θ = [0, 1]. Each agent has the same bias 0 < b < 12 .
12 θ1 and θ2 are
independently distributed.13.
Absent limited attention, our previous results still hold (in particular Proposition 4).
This suggests that strategically using delegation allows the principal to maximize the
incentives to engage in communication and allows her to always implement her preferred
decision. This would lead to a policy recommendation in which all agreements should be
designed to lead to communication. However, in practice principals are busy and cannot
spend time communicating with everyone all the time.
We therefore assume that the principal can at most communicate with one agent. We
assume that, upon learning about a possibility of communication the principal does not
instantly learn about its value, but this is only learnt through the actual communication.14
12We make the agents as similar as possible, and show that even in this case an asymmetric solution
is preferred.
13For instance, different projects take different things into account in the decision-making process or
the agents work on two different projects.
14This is what Dewatripont and Tirole (2005) coin executive decision making.
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Therefore, the principal chooses with which agent to communicate without knowing the
exact values of these communication opportunities.
The timing of this two-agent model is as follows. First, the contracting authority
chooses a delegation set for each of the agents. The only enforceable delegation sets are
the ones that freely allow the agent to choose whatever action he wants within a pre-
specified set.15 Second, the agents obtain a perfect signal si ∈ Θ. Having observed this
signal, each agent independently either chooses a decision within the initial delegation set
or he can see if the principal wants to communicate. If the principal does not want to
communicate with agent i, agent i has to choose a decision within his initial delegation
set. If the principal wants to communicate with agent i, the agent reveals his information
to the principal and the principal uses this information to allow for a decision outside the
initial delegation set. For simplicity, we assume that the principal has all the bargaining
power.
Let V (D) be the expected value from communicating with an agent who has a dele-











If there is only one agent who suggests ex post communication, then the principal
engages in communication with this agent and chooses her preferred decision. If both
agents propose communication, then the principal chooses to communicate with agent 1
if and only if
V (D1) ≥ V (D2) ,
We allow for the principal to randomize in his choice of communication partner, but he
cannot commit to this ex ante and the probability with which she randomizes has to be
an equilibrium outcome.
The principal’s problem thus becomes one of designing the two initial delegation sets
D1 and D2 so as to maximize her ex ante expected utility, given how she will behave
when/if the agents propose communication and a joint decision has to be made.
The result of this maximization is given in the next Proposition and its proof is
related to Corollary 1 and the convexity of the principal’s expected utility in α. In
15This assumption excludes delegation sets that are contingent on whether the other agent wants to
communicate or not.
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fact, in Proposition 6 we show that it is optimal for the principal to treat the agents
asymmetrically. This result is in fact a direct consequence of Jensen’s inequality.
Proposition 6. The optimal delegation strategy for the principal is the “extreme asymme-
try” situation where Di = D
∗ and Dj = D
o, (i, j) ∈ {1, 2}2, i 6= j. At the communication
stage the principal always communicates with agent i.
This proposition illustrates how even in an ex ante symmetric environment, the princi-
pal may prefer an asymmetric solution. Because of limited attention, treating the agents
symmetrically either leads to too high losses due to lost communication opportunities or
too much loss of control in the sense that the agents get to choose their preferred option
too often. By treating the agents asymmetrically, the principal acknowledges that time
is scarce and allows one of the agents some liberty in his option but strictly controls the
decision of the other agent.
In fact, the convexity of the principal’s expected utility with respect to the probability
of being available for communication with one agent (see Corollary 1) implies that always
communicating with one agent and never with the other yields a higher expected utility
than communicating with both agent with equal probability.
A note of caution: Clearly this result depends on the assumptions of a quadratic loss
function used in the delegation and communication literature. However, as long as the
principal’s utility is convex, the results should still go in this direction.
8 Discussion and conclusion
This paper has analysed two important decision making procedures; delegation and joint
decision making. We have compared the benefits of these decision making procedures as
well as the interaction between them. We have given a condition under which delegation
is preferred to ex post joint decision making. Finally we have shown how the interaction
between delegation and ex post joint decision making, always crowds out delegation.
Although some aspects of this paper are very stylized, the topic that is addressed
is of tantamount importance. As our results indicate, introducing communication may








(d− θ)dθ = 0.
Any d ∈ [0, b] solves this. However, they are all payoff equivalent to d = 0 since the agent
never wants to choose y ∈ [0, b).16




(d̄− θ)dθ = 0.
This is equivalent to
(1− d̄)2 = (d̄−min{1,max{0, d̄− b}})2.
If d̄ ≤ b then min{1,max{0, d̄ − b}} = 0. Then the first-order condition yields d̄ = 1
2
which is a contradiction (since b < 1
4
). The two possible candidates are thus d̄ = 1 and
d̄ = 1− b.
Comparing the expected utility from these two candidates, allows us to conclude that
Do = [1− b].17
Proof of Proposition 2: The proof of Proposition 2 consists in showing that if an agent
doesn’t reveal θ, then it is optimal for the principal to choose y = 0.
Assume that if no information is revealed, then the principal chooses ŷ > 0. Any agent
with θ > ŷ − ab has an incentive to reveal his information since this yields a benefit of
−(1− a)2b2 whereas keeping quiet yields −(ŷ− θ− b)2. The latter is less than the former
for all θ > ŷ − ab.
Denote by m(θ) the distribution of θ for which the agent remains silent. We know from
above that no agent with θ > ŷ− ab remains silent. Thus the support of m is included in
[0, ŷ − ab).
Without further information on θ it is optimal for the principal to choose y so as to
16To be complete, this also requires that d̄ > b. However, the next paragraph shows that this is not
possible.
17These computations are straightforward. The expected utility when d̄ = 1 is −b2 and when d̄ = 1− b






This is equivalent to choosing y to the expected value of θ. However, because these θs are
distributed on [0, ŷ−ab), clearly the mean is less than ŷ. This contradict ŷ being optimal
and the principal should deviate to a lower y.
Therefore, the only possible equilibrium decision for the principal that faces a silent
agent is to choose y = 0.
For all values of θ, choosing to reveal information and implementing y = θ+ ab yields
a higher utility than remaining silent and y = 0. Formally:
−((1− a)b)2 > −(0− θ − b)2,
which is equivalent to
−ab < θ.
This latter inequality is always true.
Proof of Proposition 3: Comparing WD and WB from Lemma 2 and 4 directly yields
the result.
Proof of Lemma 5: An agent reveals information if and only if revealing θ allows him
to get a higher utility then the best decision in D. That is, an agent with information θ
reveals θ if and only if
−(1− a)2b2 ≥ max
d∈D
−(d− θ − b)2.
Since the agent’s preferred decision is monotone in θ this is equivalent to −(1−a)2b2 ≥
−(d− θ − b)2 or −(1− a)2b2 ≥ −(d̄− θ − b)2.
These to inequalities are the same as θ ≤ d− (2− a)b or θ ≥ d̄− ab.
Proof of Lemma 6: Denote the lower bound of the optimal delegation set D∗ by d∗.
Assume that d∗ < d̄∗. The proof consists of showing that a slight increase in this lower
bound always (weakly) improves the expected utility of the principal compared to what
D∗ yields.
If d∗ ∈ (0, b], then replacing d∗ by d∗ + ε, where ε > 0 is sufficiently small, doesn’t
change the agent’s behaviour since he never chooses an action in (0, d∗] when the action
d∗ + ε is available. Therefore this change doesn’t affect the principal’s expected payoff.
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I.e., in this case we can without changing anyone’s behavior increase the lower bound of
the optimal delegation set slightly. Thus, d∗ cannot be optimal.
If d∗ > b, then by replacing d∗ by d∗ + ε, where ε > 0 is sufficiently small, we obtain a
profitable deviation from D∗. In fact, the value of this change of lower bound (as measured
by the difference in the principal’s expected utility) is
∆UP = UP (d

























































(d∗ − θ)2 − (ab)2
]
dθ
For ε small enough, the first integral is negative (because d∗ ≤ θ on this domain). Fur-
thermore, for ε small enough, the second integral is positive since on this domain the loss
from d∗ + ε is less than the loss from full delegation. It remains to show that the last
integral is postive to conclude that ∆UP ≥ 0.
On the domain [d∗ − (2− a)b, d∗ + ε− (2− a)b], we know that d∗− θ ≥ −ε+ (2−a)b.
Therefore, we have∫ d∗+ε−(2−a)b
d∗−(2−a)b
[










Since −ε+ (2− a)b()2 ≥ ((2− a)b)2, we have the following inequality∫ d∗+ε−(2−a)b
d∗−(2−a)b
[













b2((2− a))2 − (a)2
]
dθ
Since a ∈ [0, 1], we can conclude that∫ d∗+ε−(2−a)b
d∗−(2−a)b
[









Thus ∆P ≥ 0 and we have found our contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 4: From Lemma 6 we know that an optimal delegation set is a
point. Denote this point d.



















a2 (1−m(d) +M(d)) +m(d)−M(d)
]
.
Before proving Proposition 4 it is useful to show that we cannot at the same time have
d− (2− a)b < 0 and d− ab > 1. In fact, this follows directly from studying the distance
between the two and recalling that a ∈ [0, 1] and b ∈ (0, 1
4
). Formally,
d− (2− a)b− d+ ab = −2(1− a)b ∈ [−1
2
, 0].
If the distance (in absolute terms) is less than 1
2
, then one value cannot be below one and
the other above one at the same time. The five possible configurations of d− (2−a)b < 0
and d− ab > 1 are as follows:
1. d− (2− a)b ≤ d− ab ≤ 0. This yields an expected utility U1 = −(ab)2
2. d− (2−a)b ≤ 0 ≤ d−ab ≤ 1. This yields an expected utility U2 = −(ab)2−2b2(1−
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a2)(d− ab). This is less than U1 and is therefore not optimal.
3. 0 < d− (2−a)b ≤ d−ab ≤ 1. This yields an expected utility U3 = −(ab)2−2b3(1−
a2)(1− a). This is less than U1 and is therefore not optimal.
4. 0 < d− (2− a)b < 1 ≤ d− ab. This yields an expected utility U4 = −(ab)2− b2(1−
a2)(1− d+ (2− a)b). Since by assumption 1− d+ (2− a)b ∈ (0, 1), this is less than
U1 and is therefore not optimal.
5. 1 ≤ d−(2−a)b ≤ d−ab. This yields an expected utility U5 = −(ab)2. However, this
candidate involves choosing d > 1 which is not admissible (recall that d is required
to be in [0, 1]).
It is thus optimal to choose d such that d−ab ≤ 0 (and this is payoff equivalent to d = 0).
Proof of Proposition 5: To prove Proposition 5 the following lemma is useful.
Lemma 7. When d is such that d − 2b > 0, then a delegation set D = [d, d̄] yields the
same expected utility to the principal as D′ = [d− ε, d̄− ε].
Proof.
UP (D


































Long and tedious (but straightforward) computations show that UP (D
′)−UP (D) = 0.
We can thus limit the attention to delegation sets that have d ≤ 2b.
When the principal can engage in ex post communication with probability α, the













subject to 0 ≤ d̄ ≤ 1.
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If d̄− b > 0, the first-order condition yields d̄ = 1− b√



















Proof of Corollary 1: From Proposition 5 we obtain the following values for the first-
































Therefore, we know that d̄α is decreasing and concave in α. The principal’s expected












It is thus straightforward to conclude that E[up] is increasing and convex in α.
Proof of Proposition 6: Before proving the final result of Proposition 6, we present
two partial results.
The first partial result states that when communication with one agent is more valuable
than communication with the other agent, then the principal prefers extreme asymmetric
delegation.
Lemma 8. If there exists a solution to the principal’s problem such that V (Di) > V (Dj),
then Di = D
∗ and Dj = D
o, (i, j) ∈ {1, 2}2, i 6= j.
Proof. If V (D1) > V (D2), then at the communication stage, the principal prefers com-
munication with agent 1.
If there is communication with agent i, then the principal can choose her preferred
decision di and her utility from this is 0. In the case where both agents want to commu-
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nicate, the principal chooses to communicate with agent 1 and ignore agent 2 (thereby
forcing him to remain within his initial delegation set). The principal’s objective is there-
fore to minimize her loss from decisions within the authorized delegation sets as well as
losses from “missed” communication opportunities.
Furthermore, the same argument that was used to prove Lemma 6 can be used to
show that d1 = d2 = 0.
































































If this is negative, then we can conclude that d̄1 = 0 and, from the first-order condition








(d̄2 − θ)2dθ is positive, then d̄1 = 1 and the derivative of the objective
function with respect to d̄2 is negative so that d̄2 = 0. However, this cannot be the
solution as it violates V (D1) > V (D2).
Finally, if −b2 +
∫ 1
d̄2
(d̄2 − θ)2dθ = 0, it must be that d̄2 = 1 − 3
√
3b2. From the first-





can only be a solution if d̄1 =
2
3
. This is a candidate only if b < 1
9
(otherwise V (D1) is
not greater than V (D2)). Furthermore, straightforward computations of the principal’s
expected utility shows that this candidate is dominated by d̄1 = 0 and d̄2 = 1− b.
The proof is the same when V (D2) > V (D1).
Lemma 9. If an interior solution exists such that V (D1) = V (D2) ≡ V , then at the
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communication stage the principal chooses to communicate with each agent with equal






b2 if b ≤ 0.38949
0.38949 otherwise.










































where α ∈ [0, 1] is the (endogenous) probability that the principal engages in communi-
cation with agent 1 in the communication sub-game where both agents wants to commu-
nicate.
The first step of the proof is to show that d1 = d2 = 0. Assume, on the contrary, that
the optimal delegation set is such that d1 = 0. We will now proceed by showing that this
is impossible.18
If d1 ≤ 2b, then D1 is payoff equivalent to D1
⋃
[0, d1] and we can consider that the
optimal delegation set has d1 = 0.
The proof is more involved when d1 > 2b. In this case we have an interior solution for
d1 and therefore it must satisfy the first-order condition
b2 − αU2 − (1− α)
(






(d2 − θ)2dθ +
∫ 1
d̄2
(d̄2 − θ)2dθ is independent of D1. Note that the
first-order condition with respect to d̄1 looks very similar
b2 − αU2 − (1− α)
(
1− d̄2 + max{0, d2 − 2b}
)
(1− d̄1)2 = 0.
We can therefore conclude that in this scenario d1 = 1− d̄1.
18The same argument can be used to show that d2 = 0.
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Now, consider the delegation set D′1 = [d1 − ε, d̄1 − ε]. For ε = 0 this is the optimal
delegation set and for ε > 0 this is a delegation set of the same length as the optimal
delegation set, but shifted to the left (to lower values of the decision parameter). The










(d̄1 − ε− θ)2dθ
− 2α(1− d̄1 − ε− b)U2
− (1− α)(1− d̄2 + max{0, d2 − 2b})
[∫ 1−d̄1−2b−ε
0
(1− d̄1 − ε− θ)2dθ +
∫ 1
d̄1−ε−ε
(d̄1 − ε− θ)2dθ
]
.
The derivative of this expression with respect to ε is
dU eP
dε
=2αU2 + (1− α)(1− d̄2 + max{0, d2 − 2b})
[
(1− d̄1 − ε)2 − (1− d̄1 + ε)2
]
=2αU2 − 4ε(1− α)(1− d̄2 + max{0, d2 − 2b})(1− d̄1).
For small enough ε, this derivative is positive (the first term dominates) and we can
therefore conclude that for small values of ε the expected utility of the principal is higher
than with the optimal delegation set. Hence the optimal delegation set is not optimal
and we can conclude that d1 = 0.
When V (D1) = V (D2), the principal is indifferent between communication with











dθ. This can only be true if d̄1 = d̄2.























If α ∈ {0, 1}, we get the same delegation sets as in Lemma 3. However, this violates
V (D1) = V (D2).
The rest of the proof therefore focuses on α ∈ (0, 1). When d̄i − b ≥ 0 the associated
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first-order conditions for an interior solution are
− b2 + α
∫ 1
d̄2
(d̄2 − θ)2dθ + (1− α)(1− d̄2)(d̄1 − 1)2 = 0,
− b2 + (1− α)
∫ 1
d̄1
(d̄1 − θ)2dθ + α(1− d̄1)(d̄2 − 1)2 = 0.








b2. This satisfies d̄i − b ≥ 0 if and only
if b ≤ 0.38949.
When d̄i − b < 0, the associated first-order conditions for an interior solution are
− d̄21 + α
∫ 1
d̄2
(d̄2 − θ)2dθ + (1− α)(1− d̄2)(d̄1 − 1)2 = 0,
− d̄22 + (1− α)
∫ 1
d̄1
(d̄1 − θ)2dθ + α(1− d̄1)(d̄2 − 1)2 = 0.
Using the same arguments as above. d̄1 = d̄2 ≡ d̄ and α = 12 . Therefore the first-order
condition can be rewritten as
−d̄2 + 2
3
(1− d̄)3 = 0.
the solution is d̄ = 0.38949.
Finally, by comparing the outcome of all the possible delegation scenarios, we obtain
the main result in the multi-agent case. In fact, there the five possible candidates are
given in Lemma 8, 9 and by the possible symmetric corner solutions (d = d̄ = 0, d = d̄ = 1
and (d = 0, d̄ = 1)). Comparing the principal’s expected payoff in these cases yields the
result:
1. For d1 = d2 = 0, d̄i = 0 and d̄j = 1 − b, the principal’s expected payoff is W1 =
−(1− 2b)b2 − 2
3
b3.











b2 if b ≤ 0.38949
−0.085698405 otherwise.
3. d1 = d2 = d̄1 = d̄2 = 0: The principal’s expected payoff is W3 = −13 .
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5. d1 = d2 = d̄1 = d̄2 = 1: The principal’s expected payoff is W5 = −23 [b+(2b)
3(1−b)].
Comparisons of W1−W4 show that W1 is largest for all b ∈ (0, 12). Thus case 4 cannot
characterize the optimal delegation set.
It is easy to show that the case 4 is (in the eyes of the principal) dominated by the
extreme asymmetry candidate from Lemma 3. In fact, W1 −W4 = b2 > 0.
For the case 3, it is also easy to show that the principal prefers the solution candidate
from Lemma 3.







Since (1− 2b) > 0 and b < 1
2
, we have









Finally, because b > 0, we have


























where the first inequality follows from b < 1
2
.
It only remains to show when the extreme asymmetry solution in Lemma 3 is preferred
to the symmetric interior solution in Lemma 4.
When b ≤ 0.38949 a direct comparison of payoffs yields
1
b2








This is positive (and thus the extreme asymmetry solution is preferred) if and only if
b ≤ 4
9
. Since b ≤ 0.38949, we can conclude that the extreme asymmetric solution always
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dominates the interior solution for b ≤ 0.38949.
Note that dW1
db
= −2b(1− 2b) < 0. Therefore when b > 0.38949, we have W1 −W2 >
W1|b= 1
2
−W2 = −0.083333333 + 0.085698405 = 0, 002365072 > 0.
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